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Abstract
In Korea sexual harassment has attracted public attention, ever since Ms. Woo, a professor’s
assistant lecturer, sued her senior professor for sexual harassment in 1994. At that time it was debated
whether sexual harassment could be an art of tort and whether the victim should be compensated. After
this case, the notion of sexual harassment was described in the relevant Korean legislation, in
particular, the National Human Rights Commission Act and the Equal Employment Act.
The conceptual elements of sexual harassment in above mentioned two acts are very similar. ①
The sexual harasser should be an employer or an employee of a public institution standing in a
business or labor or other relationship ( Art 2. Nr. 5 of National Human Rights Commission Act) ② A
sexual harasser has to use high status at work (Art. 2 sec. 2 Equal Employment Act : art 2 sec. 5
National Human Rights Commission Act). 
Therefore, sexually related speeches and conducts constitute sexual harassment under Art. 750
Korean Civil Law, only if they satisfy the condition of power relation between the sexual harasser and
victim. The extent of legal protection against sexual harassment depends on how the power relation in
concept of sexual harassment is to be interpreted. This paper argues that the core of this power relation
is connected with gender power. However, the Korean court neither recognize nor accept the notion of
gender power. As a result, the scope of protection afforded to the victims is narrow under the present
system.
I.  Introduction 
In Korea sexual harassment has attracted public attention, ever since Ms. Woo, a
professor’s assistant lecturer, sued her senior professor for sexual harassment in
1994.1) That was the first legal action that had been taken against sexual harassment;
at that time the definition of sexual harassment itself was being considered. It was
debated whether sexual harassment could be a type of tort and whether the victim
should be compensated. 
Of course, this does not mean that there had not been cases of sexual harassment
in Korea prior to this date. Korea exemplifies a traditional, patriarchal society, which
has been subject to strict Confucian ideas. Many people in Korea still think that
specific division of labor by gender is valid. As a result, females in the Korean labor
market are usually recognized as being subordinates; female workers are often
regarded not as a colleague with equal status, but as special beings, “like flowers on
show in the office”. Under such circumstances, it is possible to deduce that sexual
remarks made by men about female colleagues may sometimes lead to sexual
harassment. 
Prior to Ms. Woo’s case in 1994, there was no precedent on imposing legal
controls on an act which is not classified as rape (Art. 297 Korean Criminal Law) or
sexual abuse (Art. 298), but constituted sexual harassment for women. This was
because the concept of sexual harassment was not distinguished from that of sexual
abuse or violence. 
For this reason, Ms. Woo’s legal action is extremely significant. After Ms. Woo’s
case, Korean legal institutions have regarded sexual harassment as a type of tort, as
defined by Art. 750 of the Korean Civil Law. Art. 7, sec. 4 of the Gender
Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act, which was enacted in 1999,2) had been
regarded as providing for compensation for acts of discrimination based on gender;
this has also been mentioned in the Equal Employment Act which has had a
prescription about sexual harassment since 1999. On the other hand, the Equal
Employment Act of 1987 had no regulation about sexual harassment. In this way,
1) Korean Supreme Court, 1998. 2. 10., 95Da39533.
2) The Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act was enacted in 1999 and repealed in 2005. The
regulation relating to the concept of sexual harassment was transferred to Art. 2, nr. 5 of the revised National Human
Rights Commission Act.
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we can definitely say the legal system against sexual harassment has certainly
improved. 
But it does not mean that all speech and behavior which may be interpreted as
sexual harassment is controlled by law system. Therefore, not all the victims of
sexual harassment may be compensated by the law. That reason is because of the
differences between the definition of sexual harassment by law and public opinion
on the matter. In this paper, I would like to discuss where such conceptual
discrepancies lie and whether these differences are justifiable for the control of
sexual harassment by law. 
II.  Methodology 
Since sexual harassment had been at first considered an illegal sexual action
constituting an type of sex discrimination based on the work of American feminist
lawyer, Catharine MacKinnon.3) Now not only in America but also in Korea sexual
harassment is described as a form of unlawful civil tort. As a result, the sexual
harasser has to compensate damages suffered by the victim.
Yet, because sexual harassment has for a long time been treated not as legal
concept but as a personal sexual intention, and now such a tendency has been
maintained somewhat in subsequent cases and in different cultural conditions about
sexual advances, the most difficult problem with regard to the concept of sexual
harassment is that sexual harassment, which is generally recognized as such in
society, is different from the one defined by the legal system and the conceptual
arguments about sexual harassment have not ended in either country.
While the traditional legal concepts in the Korean legal system came from
continental law, especially from German law, legal definitions about the concept of
sexual harassment have been derived from American law. As a result, conceptual
arguments about sexual harassment in Korea have been influenced by discussions of
it in America. 
In this paper, first the concept of sexual harassment is examined, comparing the
definition of it in American literature with the Korean one. Second, as mentioned
3) Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination, Yale
University Press, 1979.
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above, sexual harassment is a type of civil tort in America and Korea; therefore, the
legal concept of sexual harassment in both countries has to be compared. In concrete
terms, the concept of sexual harassment in judgments by Korean and American
courts as well as other relevant provisions on the definition of sexual harassment in
related Acts are examined. In the end, I would like to suggest how the concept of
sexual harassment should be defined in both the society and legal system. 
III.  Status of sexual harassment in general
A. Status of sexual harassment in Society
From 1999 to 2004, the Korean Ministry of Gender Equality officially counted
512 cases of sexual harassment. However cases reported by various phone
counselors or internet help-sites amount to about 3000 cases. Furthermore, 49.8% of
male university students conceded that they had committed sexual harassment in the
last year (2004); and 39.2% of female students have experienced sexual harassment
as victims.4)
As we know by this official reported number of sexual harassment cases, sexual
harassment is a daily occurrence not only in the workplace but also in school and in
all organizations. 
Even though sexual harassment is happening daily, generally the sexual
harassment is very differently perceived according to gender. Generally, for women
sexual harassment is described as a very troublesome thing to deal with and such an
environment results in a decline of working conditions. However, 67.3% of men
express the view that harmless sexual jokes improve the group environment. Thus,
about 46. 8 % of men give the opinion that solely sexual violence should be
punishable.5)
Such a divergence in the recognition of sexual harassment sometimes causes
emotional discussions between men and women since, for the most part, the victims
are women and the offenders are men. 
4) http://www.moge.go.kr/moge/ detail.jsp?vlndex=04020100&no=420&co. 
5) Sim, Younng Hee, Dangerous Society and Sexual Harassment, Nanam : Seoul, 1998, P. 34-35.  
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One day a female student told me that she felt she had been sexually harassed
when male students were talking to each other about sex oriented themes in front of
her face. She asked me whether such conduct could be regarded as sexual
harassment. Even if the male students did not talk about such a thing directly to her,
could such conduct be considered as sexual harassment? 
At that time as a jurist only I could answer “yes but no”. The reasons that I could
but answer in this way, were as follows:
First, because the concept of sexual harassment has been in the formulation
process, we have not had a unified notion about sexual harassment in society. 
Second, since the notion of sexual harassment has not been clear, the degree to
which legal control of all sex-related speech and conduct is possible remains unclear
also. 
B. Status of legal control against sexual harassment
Despite such conceptual unclearness, as mentioned above, in many countries
sexual harassment is classified as an object of legal control.6) For example, in
America it was 1977 when sexual harassment was first recognized by a federal
court of appeals as legally actionable as a form of sex discrimination at work
under the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.7)
In Korea, since the above mentioned Ms. Woo’s case, there have been a few
cases decided by the courts on the basis of sexual harassment. In most cases, the
court regarded sexual harassment as an type of tort under Art. 750 of the Korean
Civil Law, because it violated the sexual decisive power. Thus the victim was paid
damages.8)
Besides, legal control against sexual harassment had been imposed by the
abolished Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act. According to Art. 7
sec. 4 of this Act, sexual harassment was described as constituting an act of gender
6) In Germany, “Beschaftigtenschutzgesetz” was enacted in 1994 as a special act to protect victims from sexual
harassers.
7) Mackinnon, Sex Equality : Sexual Harassment, Foundation Press, 2003, P. 909  Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ; Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
8) Seoul District Court, 1998. 4. 30, 87Na51543 ; Seoul District Court, 2002. 11. 26, GaHab 57462.
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discrimination.9) Therefore, if someone had insisted that she or he had been sexually
harassed, it became a gender discrimination case under that legislation. The victim
of gender discrimination could file a motion for reparation to the Commission (Art.
21 Nr. 1 Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act). It had been possible
that a motion for reparation in gender discrimination could be made not only in a
written statement but also orally containing the ① name and address of the mover,
② purpose and reason of the motion and the facts supporting a case of gender
discrimination, and ③ other matters prescribed by presidential decree (Art. 21 Nr. 2
Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act). Receiving a motion for
reparation in gender discrimination cases, the Commission had to immediately
investigate the facts of the alleged gender discrimination. 
When the Commission determined that, during the investigation of a reparation
motion, a concerned case was a gender discrimination case, a mutual agreement
between the mover and the person against whom the motion had been filed could be
recommended (Art. 25 Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act). A mover
and a person against whom a motion has been filed could, when they fail to reach a
mutual agreement recommended under Art. 25, file a motion for arbitration with the
commission (Art. 26 Nr. 2 Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act). As a
result of an investigation under Art. 22, when a concerned case was acknowledged
as a gender discrimination case, the Commission could recommend ① cessation of
all acts of gender discrimination, ② restoration of original state, ③ compensation
9) In this part I explain the legal standards on the basis of the abolished Gender Discrimination Prohibition
and Relief Act, because statistics about legal control of sexual harassment cases by the National Human Rights
Committee under the new act have not been given. For reference, Art. 2, Nr. 4, (Ra) of the National Human
Rights Committee Act provides that sexual harassment  constitutes an act of gender discrimination violating
equal rights. In the case of sexual harassment, the Commission may propose to both parties concerned a
remedy necessary for the fair resolution of the case concerning the petition and recommend a compromise
(Art. 40, National Human Rights Commission Act). However, the committee can refer the parties to the
relevant conciliation procedure at the request of a party concerned or ex officio (Art. 42 of the National Human
Rights Commission Act). If both parties concerned fail to reach a compromise in the course of the procedures
for conciliation, the conciliation committee may make a decision instead of the conciliation in order to fairly
settle the case. The decision in lieu of conciliation may include ① stoppage of an act of violating human
rights, ② restitution and compensation for damage or other necessary remedies (Art. 42, sec. 3, sec. 4, nr. 1, 2
National Human Rights Commission Act). The conciliation under the provision of Art. 42 Sec. 2 and the
decision in lieu of conciliation have the same effect as a court settlement (Art. 43, National Human Rights
Commission Act).
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for damage ④ education and development of countermeasures to prevent
recurrence, and ⑤ publication in the advertisement section of daily newspapers as
reparation measures. 
By this procedure, since 1999, the Commission has dealt with 490 sexual
harassment cases. It recommended restoration of the original state in 112 cases,
mutual agreement in 7 cases, and compensation for damage in 51 cases.10)
While Korea imposes the legal controls on sexual harassment in this way, the
types of conduct identified as sexual harassment are very concretely described, even
if the meaning of the general concept is not exactly defined yet. For instance,
constant catcalls, sexual gestures, actual touching of a part of co-worker’s body,
sexual comparions of appearance, and enforcing sexual relations, etc., are regarded
as stereotypical forms of sexual harassment.11) By regulating these typical types of
conduct under an ambiguous definition sexual harassment has been controlled by the
Civil Law and Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act in conjunction
with the Equal Employment Act. 
Such conditions make it difficult to understand sexual harassment as a legal
conception, and that sometimes a victim of sexual harassment is protected by legal
reparation for damage. 
IV.  Conceptual debate about sexual harassment in America
A. Concept of sexual harassment in American literature
What can we understand as falling under sexual harassment? As outlined above,
even by enumerating the typical types of conduct regarded as sexual harassment, the
definition is not clear and it is not easy to define or delineate. Nevertheless, many
texts offer different definitions. 
In America too, there are different definitions of sexual harassment. First, for
instance, sexual harassment may be relatively simply defined as unwanted sexual
attention while at work. This definition would appear to limit harassment to actions
10) http:// www.moge.go.kr/moge/moge04/news_data/detail.jsp?vlndex=04020100&no=765&co. 
11) Ministry of Gender Equality, A Manual about Prevention against Sexual Harassment in Official
Institutions, 2003, P. 8.
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that are repeated.12) However, in actuality it is not adequate, that only repeated,
unwanted sexual actions constitute sexual harassment, because the substantial
character of the conduct, which is sexually harassment, does not depend on the
frequency but on the quality of the sexual action. 
Second, sexual harassment may be regarded as conduct, typically experienced as
offensive in nature, in which unwanted sexual advances are made in the context of a
relationship of unequal power or authority.13)
Under this definition, sexual harassment is focused on unequal power
relationships that typically form part of a harassing situation. By this definition,
wherever the relation between an offender and a victim is unequal in power, for
example between a senior official and a mere clerk or between professor and
student, etc, we can examine if it constitutes sexual harassment. 
In spite of such merits, however, this definition of sexual harassment brings
problems. In relations of unequal power it raises a question in cases where the
conductor offers a benefit in exchange for fulfillment of his or her own sexual
request and the victim is willing to go along with this and furthermore she or he
intends this in order to get such a benefit; under this circumstance sexual conduct is
acknowledged as sexual harassment. In concrete terms, for instance, if a professor
approaches a student with an offer of an automatic top mark in a test as recompense
for having sexual relations with him or her, this is sexual harassment, even if she was
interested and even if she acted willingly at the time.14)
How about the sexual bothering of one student by another student? To be
regarded as sexual harassment, must it satisfy the condition of unequal power? For
this conduct to fall within this definition of sexual harassment, it demands terms
covering not only relationships of unequal power or authority but also of unwanted
sexual advances. Therefore, here we have to clarify: first, how “unequal power” in
law is understood; and second, when consent is exists in sexual relations.   
Because the above mentioned definition of sexual harassment does not clarify
whether sexual conduct in a relationship not characterized by unequal power should
be looked upon as sexual harassment, a definition based on common sense is
12) Lebacqz, Justice and Sexual Harassment, Capital University Law Review vol. 22, Summer 1993, P. 605.
13) Friedman / Boumil / Taylor, Sexual Harassment: What it is, what it isn’t, what it does to you, and what you
can do about it, Deerfield Beach, Fla. : Health Communications, c1992, P. 9. 
14) Lebacqz, Ibid., P. 606.
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offered. By this definition, sexual harassment is bothering someone in a sexual way.15)
This definition lacks the specific attention to the power difference between the
parties, although this generally accompanies sexual harassment. Such a simple
common sense definition of sexual harassment has, however, an advantage in cases
where it is even possible to be harassed by people with less power in the
organization. For instance, with this definition we can consider it as sexual
harassment that “several women ministers told stories of being harassed by their
parishioners”.16)
This definition of sexual harassment leaves open the question of exactly what
behaviors constitute harassment, because “bothersome” behavior will differ from
person to person. The dubious meaning of “bothersome” behavior causes difficulties
in accepting sexual harassment as a legal conception. 
In this circumstance, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) has provided a very comprehensive and helpful definition of sexual
harassment. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when: (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual’s employment; (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work or academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.17)
As described above, in America the definition of sexual harassment is not clear at
present. Yet in Korea, to decide whether a conduct constitutes sexual harassment, we
have to examine the following three elements, i. e. sexually bothersome behavior,
unequal power, and subjective consent. 
B. Concept of sexual harassment in American courts
In America, legal control of sexual harassment is based on section 703 (a) (1) of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. �2000e-2 (a) : It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
15) Friedman / Boumil / Taylor, Ibid., P. 15.
16) Lebacqz, Ibid., P. 608.
17) 29 C. F. R. �1604. 11(a) (1) (2) (3).
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an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
By this provision, sexual harassment is regarded as discrimination because of
sex. However, not all conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment. In
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson of 1986, Vinson, an employee of Meritor Savings
Bank, left her job for an indefinite period because of her sickness in September
1978. On November 1, 1978, the bank discharged her for excessive use of that leave,
and Vinson brought an action against her supervisor, Taylor, and the bank, claiming
that during her four years at the bank she had constantly been subjected to sexual
harassment by him in violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court for the first time
recognized that the claim of hostile environment sexual harassment was a form of
sex discrimination actionable under the Title VII employment discrimination statute
and that the correct inquiry for issues of sexual harassment was whether sexual
advances were unwelcome, not whether employee’s participation in them was
voluntary.18)
As a result, sexual conduct becomes unlawful only when it is unwelcome, and in
concrete what ‘unwelcomeness in sexual harassment’ means was established in the
case of Henson v. City of Dundee. Henson was a dispatcher in the five-officer
Dundee Police Department. She tried to prove that she had been sexually harassed
by the chief of the Dundee Police Department, John Sellgren, by giving a statement
of three facts. First, she had been placed in a hostile and offensive working
environment for women in the police station; throughout the course of two years
during which Henson had worked for the police department, Sellgren had been
subjecting her to numerous tirades involving demeaning sexual inquiries and
vulgarities. 
Furthermore, Sellgren repeatedly requested that she have sexual relations with
him. Finally, Henson claimed that Sellgren prevented her from attending the local
police academy because of her refusing to have sexual relations with him.19) In the
reasons of the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, it was pointed out that Title VII
prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of gender, and sought to remove
18) Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 106 S. Ct.
19) Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897 (11. Cir. 1982). 
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arbitrary barriers to sexual equality at the workplace with respect to “compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”. Thus, here “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” included not only the tangible benefits concerning the
job, but also the state of psychological well being at the workplace. In order to
constitute harassment, sexual conduct had to be unwelcome in the sense that the
employee had not solicited or incited it, and in the sense that the employee had
regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.20) That means, as mentioned above
(see above IV. 1.), that if the perpetrator did not receive consent for his sexual action,
such conduct is unwelcome and it is unlawful. In this process, whether the victim’s
consent exists or not, had to be decided without any pressure, as the Court of
Appeal, Eleventh Circuit, described, that unwelcome in sexual conduct had to be
decided in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that
the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive.21)
Such subjective conditions like victim’s consent or unwelcome are not
everything as standards in deciding if sexual conduct constitutes unlawful sexual
harassment. As an objective standard, it must be examined whether sexual conduct
was bothersome with respect to the level of behavior. 
In order to conclude which sexual conduct was objectively bothersome, the court
had the applied ‘reasonable man standard’, but in Ellison v. Brady, the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit created a new standard for determining what behavior
might be bothersome. Female employee, Ellison, insisted that she was sexually
harassed by her co-worker, Gray, on the ground that he had pestered her with
unnecessary questions, telephone calls, and e-mail messages. Ellison filed a
complaint in September of 1987 in the Federal District Court, which held that
Ellison had failed to state a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile
working environment. Ellison appealed and the Court of Appeals held that the
female plaintiff had made a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual
harassment when she alleged conduct which a reasonable woman considered
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter conditions of employment and create an
abusive working environment”, by reason that “the harasser’s conduct which must
be pervasive or severe, is not the alteration in the conditions of employment and
20) Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897 (11. Cir. 1982) ; see also, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Enforcement Guidance : Policy Guidance on current issues of sexual harassment, 4. 
21) Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, Inc., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 32, 379, at 23, 648.
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employee need not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is
seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation”. On this
ground the Court of Appeals adopted the perspective of the reasonable woman
primarily because a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased
and tends to systematically ignore the experience of women.22) 
The other important question with regard to constituting sexual harassment is
about unequal power between harasser and victim. That means the harasser has an
authority over the victim. For instance, in Fragher v. City of Boca Raton, the
Supreme Court qualified the individual who was authorized to undertake tangible
employment decisions affecting the employee as a supervisor.23)
However, the Supreme Court in the case of Frager v. City of Boca Raton has
understood the conceptual meaning of supervisory authority in a broad sense. As a
term to applied vicarious liability, the sexual conductor has to use supervisory
power, in this case one of the harassers was authorized to hire, supervise, counsel,
and discipline lifeguards, while the other harasser was responsible for making the
lifeguard’s daily work assignments and supervising their work or fitness training.
The Court qualified them both as supervisors, although one of them apparently
lacked authority regarding tangible job decisions.24)
V.  Conceptual debate about sexual harassment in Korea 
A. Concept of sexual harassment in Korean literature
Conceptual uncertainty about sexual harassment and related discussions have
developed in Korea in the same way. Shin, Seong-Ja understood that sexual
harassment was described as a similar concept with sexual violence, sexual abuse,
and sexual flirtation; was expressed by language or physical conduct; and was
involved matters from small sexual jokes to rape. This definition of sexual
harassment does not makes reference to the level of sexual joke, unequal power or
22) Ellison v. Brady, 924 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
23) Frager v. City of Boca Raton, U. S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275.
24) Frager v. City of Boca Raton, U. S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275 ; see also, Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health
Center, 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. Minn. 1998).
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consent issues.25)
Another definition of sexual harassment is given by Kim Jeong-In, who defines
sexual harassment as unwanted sex related conduct evaluated as rude and
threatening by a recipient in the workplace. Here it is also unclear what unwanted
sex related conduct is evaluated as rude and threatening. Even though in his book he
deals with sexual harassment cases where the offender of sexual harassment is
limited to a senior official and professor, he accepts an unequal power difference as a
main element of sexual harassment in other pages of the book. The relationship
between his concept of sexual harassment and unequal power in sexual harassment
has caused confusion.26) In Korea, conceptual debate about sexual harassment is
ambiguous like that in America and it has continued in the field of jurisprudence. 
B. Concept of sexual harassment in Korean courts
Ms Woo’s case mentioned above was the first one in which the court
acknowledged sexual behavior as unlawful sexual harassment. In this case Ms. Woo
was Prof. Shin’s assistant in laboratory work; her official appointer was not the
harasser, Prof. Shin, but the president of the university as a proxy of the Republic of
Korea, because the act happened in a national university. However, Prof. Shin had
substantial power to nominate his assistant. Ms. Woo alleged that since Jun 5. 1992,
Prof. Shin had attempted unwanted touching of her body 20 or 30 times, whenever
he taught her how to use instruments in the laboratory. Because of this unwanted
body contact, Ms. Woo worked in a thick winter jacket, even though it was summer,
tried to express that she felt unpleasant, but never told him to stop engaging in such
disgusting behavior. Furthermore, saying that she could change her uncomfortable
clothes into jeans etc. in his office, he suggested they take a walk. Ms. Woo refused
the suggestion clearly and said “no” immediately. After that Prof. Shin made her
working conditions difficult, made negative comments about things she did in
laboratory and ultimately dismissed her on June 25, 1993. 
25) Shin, Seong-Ja(1993), A type of sexual harassment, negative effect and a victim’s individual trait of
character in working place, Study of Social Science Bd.V, Research Institute on Social Science in Kyungnam
University, P.94
26) Kim, Jeong-In, Understanding and reality of sexual conduct which constitute sexual harassment, -
psychological approach -, Kyoyookkwahaksa, 2000, P. 35
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The Seoul District Court defined for the first time how to understand unlawful
sexual harassment. In its reasons, the District Court of Seoul held as follows. First,
sexual harassment was the act of giving another worker an unpleasant feeling
through sex oriented speech and conduct or sexually humiliating them by someone
who formally had the right of director or appointer or had active or passive authority
to affect a worker’s nomination, position in the workplace, or working conditions.
Second, if a man with authority makes a sexual advance to another worker and they
give advantages or disadvantages concerning employment or working conditions
depending on whether or not they deny such a sexual suggestion, this violates the
worker’s individual dignity, the right of pursuit of happiness, the right to labor under
conditions securing gender equality, and individual sexual freedom. This is
described as unlawful conduct against the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of gender by the Equal Employment Act and Korean Constitution.27)
The definition of sexual harassment by the Seoul District Court involved three
elements, i. e. (1) unequal power relation between offender and a victim; (2)
unpleasant and humiliated feeling, in other words unwelcome according to the
victim’s subjective terms; and (3) recognition of one of two forms of sexual
harassment (‘quid pro quo’ or hostile working environment). Even if the Seoul
District Court points to these three elements of sexual harassment, the concrete
concepts are not defined clearly. The Seoul District Court recognizes not only
someone who has the formal right of director or appointer, but also those who have
active or passive authority to affect a worker’s nomination, position in the
workplace, and working conditions as a supervisor;  therefore, offenders are
relatively broadly recognized.  
In the same case, however, the Seoul Court of Appeal expressed a somewhat
different idea. The Court of Appeal recognized that sexual advances, which
constitute sexual harassment and are protected by tort law in Art. 750 of the Korean
Civil Law, had to fulfill the following conditions. First, sexual harassment had to be
conducted in relation to employment. Second, even if sexual harassment involved
sexual conduct, i.e. demands to accept unpleasant sexual access and every other sex
oriented language and act, the implied sexual character had to be clearly open and
sexual intent had to be obvious (therefore physical contact necessary for education,
27) The District Court of Seoul in Civil Relation, 1994. 4. 18, 93GaHab77840.
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demonstrations of close friendship, or formal conduct by custom of society did not
amount to sexual harassment). Third, sexual harassment had to be unwanted
conduct by a party. However, in deciding whether sexual conduct is unwanted or
unwelcome, the court must consider both the victim’s psychological attitude to the
circumstances as well as the objective circumstances of that conduct. Furthermore,
the damage both psychological and social suffered by the victim due to prejudice in
the society has to be taken into consideration. Fourth, discrimination on the ground
of sex in relation to employment conditions (“quid pro quo” case) and working
environment (“hostile working environment” case) is to be implied in sexual
harassment. If sexual conduct is composed of only simple speech or non-repeated
behavior and the victim suffers no concrete disadvantages in employment position
and other working conditions, the illegality of the act is denied. Illegality about
sexual harassment is to be decided from the view point of ordinary people who
understand the relationship between men and women as one of harmony, and not
from the feminist’s view point, in which the relationship between men and women
is described as a combative and confrontational one.28) In this way, the Court of
Appeal has suggested very difficult conditions be met for sexual conduct to
constitute unlawful sexual harassment. Especially, while the Court of Appeal
regarded the hostile working environment case as a form of sexual harassment,
illegality of sex oriented speech or behavior is denied, if it is not repeated and the
victim has no concrete disadvantages in employment position and other working
conditions. Thus, in the case of hostile working environment, unlawful sexual
harassment is understood in a narrow sense.
Especially, as the Court of Appeal characterized the feminists’ viewpoints on
gender relations as “combative and confrontational”, the possibility for the adoption
of a sex-sensitive standard like the “reasonable women standard” in deciding the
level of sex oriented conduct which constitutes unlawful sexual harassment has been
cut off. 
On the contrary the Korean Supreme Court gave a different opinion about the
definition of sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment
amounting to a tort in �750 Korean Civil Law need not be restricted to the case
where there is a employment relationship between a victim and an offender. 
28) The Court of Appeal in Seoul, 1995. 7. 25., 94 Na 5358.
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 5, No.2, 2006
79
In particular, the Supreme Court could not accept an analysis of sexual
harassment that distinguished quid pro quo cases from hostile working environment
cases or a view that especially in case of the latter the extent and level of sexual
conduct had to be severe. Furthermore, the Korean Supreme Court rejected
assertions that: (1) in order to satisfy the conditions for torts under �750 of the
Korean Civil Law, sexual conduct itself had to cause undue interference in the
victim’s execution of work; (2) the victim’s working ability was really obstructed
due to the hostile working circumstances; and (3) as a result the victims who claimed
damages had to prove that they suffered not only anger, sorrow, or astonishment, but
also mental pain due to the sexual harassment.29)
In this suit Ms. Woo from the beginning of the litigation process in the Seoul
District Court , had sought compensation for tort under Art. 750 Korean Civil Law
against Prof. Shin and compensation from the Republic of Korea as Prof. Shin’s
employer.  She won the case against Prof. Shin but failed in the action against the
Republic of Korea as employer. The Korean Supreme Court judged that the
Republic of Korea as an employer could not have known what sort of conduct
happened in the laboratory. Furthermore, the conduct of the defendant, Prof. Shin,
was a personal sexual inclination, so the Republic of Korea as employer could not
have known about it. 
However, in relation to the defendant, Prof. Shin, the Korean Supreme Court
acknowledged his liability because his sexual harassment was a form of tort under
Art. 750 of the Korean Civil Law. The Korean Supreme Court held that the
classification of sexual harassment into quid pro quo cases and hostile working
environment cases was unnecessary. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held, that such
classification between quid pro quo cases and hostile working environment only had
an effect as a standard of sum of compensation. 
C. The definition of sexual harassment by Equal Employment Act 
and National Human Right Commission Act - with reference to abolished
Gender Discrimination  Prohibition and Relief Act - 
In Korea the notion of sexual harassment in law was described for the first time
29) Korean Supreme Court, 1998. 2. 10., 95 Da 39533.
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in Art. 2 sec. 2 and Art. 7 sec. 4 of the Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief
Act, which was enacted after Ms. Woo won her case in the Korean Supreme Court.
Under this legal definition, sexual harassment meant acts by employers and
employees in business, employment, and other relations, including servants of public
institutions who caused in the victim the sense of being sexually humiliated or
insulted by using their positions or any sexual language or act in relation to business
or gave a disadvantage in employment by reason of a refusal to respond to such a
sexual language or act or other sexual demand. Art. 7 sec. 4 of the Act provided that
sexual harassment was to be regarded as sexual discrimination. 
Also, according to Art. 2 sec. 2 of the Equal Employment Act, sexual harassment
at work refers to a situation where an employer, a senior or worker makes another
worker feel sexually humiliated or offended by engaging in sexually charged
behavior or language using their high status at work or in relation to work, or gives
disadvantages in employment on account of no response to sexual gestures or other
requests. 
Of these two Acts mentioned above, the Gender Discrimination Prohibition and
Relief Act is now abrogated because the Korean Ministry of Gender Equality was
changed to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family from June 1, 2005.
Accordingly, due to the alteration of the responsible government organ, legal control
of sexual harassment is regulated by the National Human Rights Commission Act
instead of the Gender Discrimination Prohibition and Relief Act. Under the new Act,
sexual harassment is regarded as a discriminatory act which violates the right of
equality (Art. 2, Nr. 4, Ra). By Art. 2, Nr. 5 of the National Human Rights
Commission Act, the notion of sexual harassment is described using the same
wording as Art. 2 sec. 2 of the abolished Gender Discrimination Prohibition and
Relief Act.
As a result, the notion of sexual harassment under Art. 2 sec. 2 of the Equal
Employment Act and Art. 2 Nr. 5 of the National Human Rights Commission Act is
the generally accepted concept in the Korean legal system. 
If we examine the regulations about sexual harassment in the two acts mentioned
above, we can find the content is very similar. In concrete terms, the main points of
both acts can be summarized as follows: 
① The first sexual harasser should be employer and employee in business,
employment and other relation or a servant of a public Institution under Art 2. Nr. 5
of National Human Rights Commission Act. 
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 5, No.2, 2006
81
Who is such a person? We can count, for example, employers, supervisors and
colleagues in a direct employment relationship and business acquaintances. As for
public institutions in this Act, we can count government organs, local communal
governments and schoosl etc., and servants of such a public institutes include the
directors of public institutes,as well. 
Also, Art. 2 sec. 2 of the Equal Employment Act provides that the necessary
conditions of sexual harasser are no different in comparison with the definition of
sexual harassment in Art. 2 sec. 5 of National Human Rights Commission Act. Only
in art 2 sec. 5 of National Human Rights Commission Act, however, servants of
public institutes are added as offenders. We can remark that in such a regulation
about sexual harassment the law demands special conditions for qualification as a
sexual harasser. 
② A sexual harasser has to use their high status at work and the conduct must be
in relation to work or their position (Art. 2 sec. 2 Equal Employment Act; art 2 sec. 5
National Human Rights Commission Act). 
By this regulation we can be cognizant of the fact that in the law sexual
harassment is based on a power relation. The sexual harasser, who uses his or her
high status or position, has the power to victimize. If the sexual harasser need not
always use the power relation, in this case the Equal Employment Act demand
relation to work. 
③ The sexual harasser can use not only direct physical contact but also only
language. 
④ To recognize as conduct sexual harassment, it is not necessary to give
disadvantage in Employment on account of no response to sexual gesture or
requests. It is also acknowledged that the victim is only sexually humiliated or
offended by sexually charged speech or behavior. 
So we may say that in cases where someone feels that she or he was sexually
humiliated or offended by sexually charged language she or he is a victim of sexual
harassment. But in order that such a conduct is recognized as sexual harassment by
law, another two conditions need to be satisfied. 
Namely, the offender must be an employer or employee in business employment
or a servant or director of a government organ, local communal government or
school and he or she has to have the chance to use his or her high position and to act
in relation to work. For this reason not every conduct that is connected with sex and
makes someone feel that she is sexually humiliated and offended is a sexual
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harassment by prescription of related law.  
As a result, in this situation, we can not give legal protection to a person who is
sexually humiliated or offended by sexual charged behavior or language. Namely,
sexual harassment in the law is not about the extent of such sex charged conduct, but
about the parties concerned. 
Clearly someone, that feels sexually humiliated and offended by by conduct
can assert her or his right to civil suit under Art. 750 of the Korean Civil Law.
However, in this case the notion of sexual harassment in the Equal Employment
Act and National Human Right Commission Act applies to civil suit. Therefore,
sexually related speeches and acts compose sexual harassment under Art. 750 of
the Korean Civil Law, only if they satisfy the condition of power relation between
sexual harasser and victim. That means, the person who is sexually humiliated can
claim tort under Art. 750 of the Korean Civil Law, if such an act occurs in the
context of a power relation. The extent of legal protection against sexual
harassment depends on how the power relation in the concept of sexual
harassment is to be interpreted.
Sexual harassment happens in a power relation. The core of this power relation is
connected with gender power. In daily life men take this gender power and sexual
harassment is a means to exercise it.30)
VI.  Conclusion 
In Korea the restriction of sexual harassment is possible in two ways. The first is
the control of sexual harassment by the National Human Rights Commission Act
and Equal Employment Act. As stated above, in this case the sexual harassment is
not about the extent of conduct but about the parties concerned. So the boundary of
application of these acts is very limited. 
The second, although the Korean Supreme Court recognizes sexual conduct
which is violating the law, as a type of tort by Art. 750 Korean Civil Law and
someone, who is sexually harassed, can charge compensation of damages.
However, the Korean court neither recognize nor accept the notion of gender
30) Sim, Young Hee, Dangerous Society and Sexual Harassment, Nanam : Seoul, 1998, P. 169 ff.
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power. The power relation in sexual harassment is very limited interpreted by
Korean law system. As a result, it leads that the victim by sexual harassment is
narrow protected.  
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